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Case Comment
Jones v. United States: Automatic Commitment of
Individuals Found Not Guilty by Reason of
Insanity
Michael Jones was apprehended while attempting to
shoplift a jacket and charged in the District of Columbia Superior Court with attempted petit larceny, a misdemeanor carrying a maximum prison term of one year.' At the arraignment,
the court ordered Jones committed to a public hospital for the
mentally ill to determine his competency to stand trial. Psychological testing indicated that Jones suffered from paranoid
schizophrenia and that his behavior in the department store
was the product of this mental disease. Deemed competent to
stand trial, Jones claimed the insanity defense and was found,
by a preponderance of the evidence, not guilty by reason of insanity.2 Jones was thereupon hospitalized in compliance with
the automatic commitment provision of the District of Columbia Code.3
As required by the Code, a hearing was held fifty days after
Jones's automatic commitment.4 Because he failed to prove his
sanity at this hearing,5 the court determined that Jones was
1. See Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3047 (1983).
2. The government did not challenge Jones's claim, and his mental condition was stipulated in the facts of the trial record. Id. at 3047.
3. Section 24-301(d) (1) of the District of Columbia Code provides:
If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense raises the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the
ground that he was insane at the time of its commission, he shall be
committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant to this subsection or subsection (e) of this
section.
D.C. CODE ANN.§ 24-301(d) (1) (1981).
4. This hearing requirement is stated in § 24-301(d) (2) (A) of the District
of Columbia Code: "A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection shall have a hearing, unless waived, within 50 days of his confinement
to determine whether he is entitled to release from custody."
5. Section 24-301(d)(2)(B) of the District of Columbia Code provides:
"The person confined shall have the burden of proof. If the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the person confined is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or unconditional, the court shall enter
such order as may appear appropriate."
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presently mentally ill and dangerous, and ordered his confinement continued until he regained his sanity and no longer
6
posed a danger to himself or to society.
After he had been hospitalized for more than one year, the
court held a second release hearing.7 At this hearing Jones
challenged both his institutionalization for a longer time than
he would have served if convicted and the standard of proof
used at his initial commitment hearing to establish present
mental illness and dangerousness. 8 Jones demanded an unconditional release or, alternatively, a recommitment hearing applying the higher "clear and convincing evidence" standard
required for civil commitment. 9 Upon the Superior Court's denial of these demands, Jones brought his claim before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.10 A panel of the appellate
court affirmed the lower court's denial," but subsequently
6. See 103 S. Ct. at 3047. Under the District of Columbia Code, the determination of the hospitalized individual's condition is to be made initially by the
superintendent of the hospital and submitted to the clerk of the court in which
the individual was tried. The court may then order the release of the person or
conduct a judicial hearing. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (1981).
7. Jones was entitled to this second hearing under § 24-301(k) (1) of the
District of Columbia Code, which states:
A person in custody or conditionally released from custody, pursuant to the provisions of this section, claiming the right to be released
from custody, the right to any change in the conditions of his release,
or other relief concerning his custody, may move the court having jurisdiction to order his release, to release him from custody, to change the
conditions of his release, or to grant other relief.
The statute does not require the court to entertain such motions more
often than once every six months. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(k) (5) (1981).
8. Jones would have served a maximum sentence of one year had he
been convicted on the original shoplifting charge. See 103 S. Ct. at 3047. His
constitutional challenge to the procedural nature of his commitment hearing
may be partially attributable to his obtaining new counsel following his initial
hearing. See id.
9. Id. Section 21-545(b) of the District of Columbia Code, which governs
civil commitment, provides:
If the court or jury finds that the person is mentally ill and, because of
that illness, is likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain at liberty, the court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate period, or order any other alternative course of treatment which
the court believes will be in the best interests of the person or of the
public.
This provision has been interpreted to require a "clear and convincing" standard of proof to meet due process requirements. See In re Nelson, 408 A.2d
1233, 1238 (D.C. 1979).
10. See Jones v. United States, 396 A.2d 183 (D.C. 1978), rev'd on rehearing,
411 A.2d 624 (D.C. 1980), vacated and reheard en bane, 432 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1981),
afd, 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983). Jones claimed that the Superior Court's decision
was unfairly based on his express failure to challenge his intial commitment.
Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d 364, 367 (D.C. 1981), afld, 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983).
11. 396 A.2d at 190.
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granted a rehearing and, two years later, reversed the decision.12 The court of appeals heard the case en bane the following year and reaffirmed the Superior Court's decision.13 The
United States Supreme Court upheld that decision, holding
that an insanity acquittee may be committed for an indeterminate time based on proof of present mental illness and dangerousness by only a preponderance of the evidence, a standard
lower than that required for involuntary civil commitment.
Jones v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 3043 (1983).
Central to resolution of the issue presented in Jones is
what, if any, distinction may be made between insanity acquittees and individuals who are civilly committed. 14 The dispute
focuses on whether commission of a criminal act justifies a
lower standard of proof for commitment to a mental institution.
Implicit in this debate is the validity of the presumption that
committing a criminal act supports an inference of continuing
mental illness and dangerousness sufficient to justify commit15
ting an individual indefinitely.
The Supreme Court has recognized the significant liberty
interests at stake in any commitment. In Specht v. Patterson,l6
the Court stated that "commitment proceedings whether denominated civil or criminal are subject both to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... and to the
Due Process Clause."' 7 This recognition is reflected in the high
12. Jones v. United States, 411 A.2d 624 (D.C. 1980), vacated and reheard en
bane, 432 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1981), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983). In vacating its earlier decision, the court reasoned that because the release hearing procedure is
to some extent punitive, it would be a denial of equal protection to confine
Jones under criminal commitment procedures beyond his hypothetical maximum prison sentence. See id. 411 A.2d at 630.
13. Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1981), affld 103 S. Ct. 3043
(1983). The court rejected the punitive analysis of the panel decision, holding
that the "only factors relevant to release from a mental institution are the acquittee's continued dangerousness and his need for treatment." Id. at 376.
14. Civil commitment in the District of Columbia requires a showing of
present mental illness and dangerousness by "clear and convincing" evidence.
See supra note 9.
15. See, for example, S. REP. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955), which
specifically articulates this presumption:
Where [the] accused has pleaded insanity as a defense to a crime, and
the jury has found that the defendant was, in fact, insane at the time
the crime was committed, it is just and reasonable in the Committee's
opinion that the insanity, once established, should be presumed to continue and that the accused should automatically be confined for treatment until it can be shown that he has recovered.
16. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
17. Id. at 608. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). In
O'Connor, the Court noted that commitment is a deprivation of constitutionally
guaranteed liberty, not justified absent a determination that the individual is

1984]

AUTOMATIC COMMITMENT

standard of proof required in civil commitment cases. In Addington v. Texas,18 a case involving an individual civilly committed by his mother after he had repeatedly threatened her, the
Court first established that the fourteenth amendment requires
a "clear and convincing" standard of proof in a civil proceeding
brought under state law to commit an individual involuntarily
to a state mental hospital for an indefinite period.19 Because an
involuntary civil commitment involves such a significant deprivation of liberty, the Addington Court concluded that the risk
of an erroneous commitment-such as one for mere "idiosyncratic behavior" actually not outside of the range of acceptable
conduct-must be placed on society, not on the individual.20
The requirement that insanity be proven by "clear and convincing evidence" was intended to provide this protection, and consequently this standard became a due process requirement for
involuntary civil commitments. 2 '
The Supreme Court applied this high standard of proof in
Jackson v. Indiana,22 a case involving the indefinite commitment of a deaf-mute deemed incompetent to stand trial for
petit robbery. Considering the significant liberty interest at
stake, the Court held that due process required that individuals
accused of crimes and committed solely because of their incapacity to stand trial be subject to the same standards for commitment and release as are individuals committed civilly.23
Before Jones, the Supreme Court had never determined
whether the "clear and convincing" evidence standard applied
to those accused of criminal acts and found competent to stand
presently both mentally ill and dangerous, id. at 573-76, and holding that a person who had been unnecessarily hospitalized for 15 years retained the constitutional right to liberty, id.
18. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
19. Id. at 419-20, 433.
20. Id. at 426-27.
21. In reaching the "clear and convincing" standard the Court acknowledged the uncertainties involved in making determinations of mental illness
and dangerousness, explaining that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), would impose too great a burden on the
state. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 429-30. This same "clear and convincing" standard has been used by the Appellate Court for the District of Columbia in interpreting the civil commitment provision of the District of Columbia Code. See

supra note 9.
22. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
23. Id. at 738. The Jackson Court reasoned that a person incompetent to
stand trial may be held for no more than a reasonable period of time, to determine whether the person will attain competency. When it appears that the person will not become competent in the foreseeable future, the state must either
release the individual or begin civil commitment proceedings. Id.
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trial but not guilty by reason of insanity. In its rulings in the
context of '"prison transfer" 24 cases, however, the Court has
recognized that even individuals convicted of crimes have significant liberty rights requiring due process protection before
commitment. In Baxstrom v. Herold,25 the Supreme Court held
that the state of New York could not commit an individual at
the end of his or her prison term without providing a jury trial,
specifically stating that commission of a criminal act did not
justify commitment procedures different from those followed in
civil commitment hearings. 2 6 Similarly, in Humphrey v.
Cady,27 involving a sex offender involuntarily committed for
treatment in lieu of imprisonment, the Court was concerned
about deprivation of liberty without due process, although in
Humphrey the concern arose only after the individual had been
confined for longer than the maximum possible prison term for
the crime.28 Finally, in Vitek v. Jones,29 the Court recognized
that due process concerns may arise when an imprisoned individual is transferred to a mental hospital for treatment before
the end of the prison term if the transfer involves a change in
the conditions of confinement not "'within the sentence imposed upon [the prisoner].' "30 These prison transfer cases are
distinguishable from the case of an individual found not guilty
24. "Prison transfer" cases involve individuals sentenced to prison and
transferred to mental hospitals either during or at the end of their prison
terms.
25. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
26. Id. at 114-15. Although the Baxstrom Court used equal protection analysis in support of its holding, subsequent decisions have viewed the issue in
terms of due process. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980) (fourteenth amendment due process clause entitles convicted prisoner to procedural
safeguards before involuntary transfer to state mental hospital due to the
strong liberty interests involved); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967)
(both criminal and civil commitment proceedings are subject to fourteenth
amendment equal protection and due process clauses).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit followed the Baxstrom analysis in Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The Bolton
court rejected the presumption of continuing insanity, stating that "the commission of criminal acts does not give rise to a presumption of dangerousness
. . 'while
'
prior criminal conduct is relevant to the determination whether a
person is mentally ill and dangerous, it cannot justify denial of procedural safeguards for that determination."' Id. at 647 (quoting Cameron v. Mullen, 387
F.2d 193, 201 (1967)).
27. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
28. See id. at 510-11. It should be noted that the petitioner in Humphrey
did not raise the issue of mental incompetency, and there was no real claim
that mental illness caused him to commit the crime. Rather, the court was
given the option to commit for treatment an individual convicted under the
Wisconsin Sex Offenders Act in lieu of imprisonment. See id. at 507.
29. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
30. 445 U.S. at 493 (quoting Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)).
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by reason of insanity primarily because an insanity acquittee
voluntarily raised the insanity defense and was found not responsible for the criminal act.3 ' Prison transfer cases nonetheless reflect the Supreme Court's recognition that the significant
liberty interest at stake whenever an individual is involuntarily
committed requires some due process protection, even when
the individual has engaged in a criminal act.
Previous Supreme Court decisions have also held that a
prior criminal act is not determinative of a person's present
mental illness and dangerousness, and thus does not alone satisfy due process. In Baxstrom v. Herold,3 2 the Court noted that
a finding of past dangerousness is not relevant to whether the
individual is presently mentally 111.33 In Lynch v. Overholser,34
a case involving the involuntary commitment of an individual
found guilty of writing bad checks, the Court concluded that although a record of past criminal acts is significant in determining present mental illness and dangerousness, it is by no
means conclusive. 35 The Court stated in Lynch that "the fact
that the accused has pleaded guilty or that, overcoming some
defense other than insanity, the Government has established
that he committed a criminal act constitutes only strong evidence that his continued liberty could imperil 'the preservation
36
of public peace."'
Despite the Supreme Court's recognition of the significant
liberty interest involved in the commitment process and its determination that past criminal activity, without more, does not
establish present mental illness and dangerousness, some state
courts have distinguished between candidates for civil commitment and insanity acquittees. 3 7 Procedural disparities, includ31. No one claimed that any of the individuals in the prison transfer context were not culpable; even in Cady the trial court merely considered treatment preferable to imprisonment, not that insanity had actually caused Cady
to commit the sex-related offense. See supra note 28.
32. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
33. Id. at 111. Whether this portion of Baxstrom is overruled by the
Court's decision in Jones is not clear. The Jones Court did, however, state that
"[i]t comports with common sense to conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit a criminal act is likely to remain ill
and in need of treatment." 103 S. Ct. at 3050.
34. 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
35. See id. at 714. Although Lynch was decided prior to Baxstrom, the
Court's reliance on Lynch in Jones evidences its status as good law. See infra
notes 55-56 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
36. 369 U.S. at 714 (emphasis added).
37. Distinctions between civil commitment candidates and insanity acquittees are most commonly used to justify automatic commitment procedures fol-
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ing automatic commitment of those not guilty by reason of
insanity, have been justified by the assumption that persons
who have committed crimes in the past for which they were not
held responsible by reason of mental incapacity continue to be

39
mentally i1138 and are, by their nature, dangerous to society.

This presumption of continuing insanity is frequently motivated by the attitude among many state courts that it is in society's best interest to commit individuals who have relied on
mental illness to avoid criminal liability. For example, in Chase
v. Kearns40 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld the
lowing an insanity acquittal. See, e.g., In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 147, 496 P.2d
465, 478, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 566 (1972) (automatic commitment provision upheld
because insanity acquittees have, as a class, proven their dangerousness
through the commission of criminal acts); Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132, 134
(Me. 1971) (criminal acquittal based on insanity creates an emergency situation requiring immediate commitment).
38. See, e.g., Orencia v. Overholser, 163 F.2d 763, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (denial
of habeas corpus petition of individual determined not guilty by reason of insanity for her child's death); Franklin,7 Cal. 3d at 141 n.9, 496 P.2d at 474 n.9,
101 Cal. Rptr. at 562 n.9 (court denied challenge to automatic commitment following an insanity acquittal for making a false bomb report, holding "when insanity has been adjudicated it is 'presumed to continue unless the contrary is
shown'") (quoting In re Zanetti, 34 Cal. 2d 136, 138, 208 P.2d 657, 658 (1949));
Mills v. State, 256 A.2d 752, 755 (Del. 1969) (insanity of person acquitted of second-degree murder and two charges of assault with intent to murder presumed
to continue).
This presumption of continuing insanity has not been considered conclusive by all state courts. In State v. Allan, 166 N.W.2d 752 (Iowa 1969), a case
involving commitment of an individual acquitted of assault with intent to murder, the presumption of continuing insanity was used. The Allan court, however, stated that the presumption is not conclusive and may be rebutted by
other evidence. See id. at 758.
39. Although this assumption is commonly made, its validity may be questioned based on a 1978 survey conducted by officials at the New York State Office of Mental Health, which revealed that during that year 1,625 persons were
acquitted by reason of insanity. These verdicts were based on a variety of
crimes, many nonviolent in nature. The report indicates:
In New Jersey, Missouri, and Oregon the number of serious crimes was
sharply less than the other two States [Michigan and New York] with available
data. Respectively, 26 percent, 5 percent, and 5 percent of their total acquittals
were for murder. Less serious assaults (35 percent, 22 percent, and 14 percent,
respectively) along with a wide range of other less serious crimes
predominated among acquittals.
Overall, there is wide variation of the seriousness of the crimes of insanity
acquittees by jurisdiction. Minor offenses are always frequent among NGRIs
[those not guilty by reason of insanity] and in some jurisdictions minor crimes
make up the vast majority of all crimes. In contrast to public perceptions and
media portrayals, all insanity acquittees are not assassins, rapists, deranged
mutilators, or mass murderers. It would be inappropriate to predicate policy on
popular conceptions of acquittees.
InsanityDefense in Federal Courts: Hearingson H.R. 6783 Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
78-87 (1982).
40. 278 A.2d 132 (Me. 1971).
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automatic commitment of an insanity acquittee, stating:
Once a defendant has been found "not guilty by reason of mental disease or mental defect," special factors and policy considerations rationally justify immediate commitment inasmuch as such a defendant
might or could be incapable of controlling his behavior, might or could
be an instrumentality of harm to himself or others, might or could be
in need of study, observation and treatment for the accomplishment of
which, in the shortest possible time, hospital confinement is
reasonable.4 1

Although not embracing the various state courts' motivations for approving automatic commitment of those found not
guilty by reason of insanity, the Supreme Court in Jones relied
heavily on this line of state cases, retreating from the Court's
past increasingly favorable attitude toward the rights of mentally ill offenders.4 2 Justice Powell, writing for a majority of
five,43 stated four major reasons for upholding all aspects of
Jones's commitment: (1) a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity supports a presumption of continuing insanity and dangerousness that sufficiently justifies commitment of an
individual for the purposes of treatment and the protection of
society;" (2) the preponderance of the evidence standard for
the commitment of insanity acquittees meets due process requirements; 45 (3) because an insanity acquittee's hypothetical
prison term is simply not relevant to the commitment's purpose, insanity acquittees may be confined without a civil commitment hearing until they are no longer mentally ill and
41. Id. at 135 (emphasis in original). Chase involved automatic indeterminate commitment of an individual judged not guilty by reason of insanity on
charges of making oral threats to injure another.
The Chase analysis, that insanity acquittees are in a different class than
candidates for civil commitment, is supported by United States v. Brown, 478
F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Brown, the petitioner was acquitted of a number of
charges, including robbery, assault, rape, and carrying an unlicensed pistol, due
to insanity. The Brown court stated that "[insanity acquittees] are in a different position, at least for some purposes, from persons who have not committed
any such acts but are sought to be civilly committed solely because of dangers
and propensities arising from mental condition." Id. at 610. That those found
not guilty by reason of insanity are considered different from those civilly committed is further evidenced by court opinions upholding automatic commitment. See supra notes 37-38.
42. See supra notes 16-37 and accompanying text.
43. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor
joined in the opinion of the Court. 103 S. Ct. at 3045.
44. Id. at 3050.
45. Id. at 3051. The Court distinguished Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979), stating that "the proof that he committed a criminal act as a result of
mental illness eliminates the risk that he is being committed for mere 'idiosyncratic behavior' ....
A criminal act by definition is not 'within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable."' 103 S. Ct. at 3051 (quoting Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. at 426-27) (citations omitted).
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dangerous, even if that time is longer than the hypothetical
prison sentence;46 and (4) in an area "fraught with medical and
scientific uncertainties" 47 requiring assessments and predictions of mental capacity and dangerousness, the Court should
defer to society's determinations as reflected by the acts of
Congress. 48
Justice Brennan, in dissent,49 rejected the majority's discussion of whether a higher standard is required to continue incarceration for longer than an individual's hypothetical prison
sentence, countering that the real issue was whether an insanity acquittal by itself provides an adequate basis for involuntary, indefinite commitment.5 0 The government's interests in
committing Jones, according to Justice Brennan, were the same
as those involved in civil commitment and prison transfer
cases---"isolation, protection, and treatment of a person who
may, through no fault of his own, cause harm to others or to
himself' 5 1 -and must be balanced against the individual's liberty interests.5 2 Justice Brennan denied the majority's assertion that the mere fact of mental illness and past criminal
behavior supports commitment under a standard of proof lower
than that required in other commitment contexts, stating that
the risk of erroneous commitment following an insanity acquittal is not sufficiently diminished to justify a departure from
5 3
civil commitment procedural standards.
The Jones majority noted Justice Brennan's concerns, but
found the commission of a past criminal act sufficiently probative of present mental illness and dangerousness to justify automatic commitment, even though insanity had only been
determined as of the time of the criminal act and only by a preponderance of the evidence. In support of this presumption,
the Court cited congressional reports concluding that an individual once found insane should "automatically be confined for
46. Id. at 3052.
47. Id. at 3053 (quoting Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974)).
48. 103 S. Ct. at 3053.
49. Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's dissent. Id
at 3053.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 3056.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 3061. Justice Stevens wrote a brief separate dissent in which he
stated that a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity may justify commitment of
an insanity acquittee for a period equal to the acquittee's hypothetical prison
term. At the expiration of that term, Stevens asserted, the government must
show by "clear and convincing" evidence that additional confinement is appropriate. Id.
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treatment until it can be shown that he has recovered. ' 54 The
Court also relied on its previous opinion in Lynch v. Overholser5 5 for the blanket proposition that a criminal act is "strong
evidence that [the acquittee's] continued liberty could imperil
'the preservation of the peace."'-5 6 Furthermore, the Jones
Court held that the criminal act need not have been violent in
nature to provide the requisite element of dangerousness. 5 7
The Court's analysis in its first reason for upholding
Jones's commitment-that commission of a criminal act justifies a presumption of present mental illness and dangerousness-presents a number of difficulties. The Court ostensibly
based its conclusion on Lynch, but in doing so either reinterpreted or misread its own language in that case. The Lynch
Court indicated that past criminal acts are strong evidence of
present mental illness and dangerousness, 58 but did not consider these acts conclusive. In upholding the trial court's decision and its standard of proof, however, the Supreme Court in
Jones conclusively presumed that insanity acquittees are dangerous and likely to commit further criminal acts, without requiring any additional evidence of present dangerousness. 5 9
Perhaps the Supreme Court applied the Lynch standard in
Jones, and determined that additional evidence was unnecessary in this particular case or considered other evidence not
mentioned in the opinion.60 On the other hand, the Court may
54. Id. at 3049 (quoting S. REP. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955)).
For a discussion of the 1955 senate report, see supra note 15.
55. 103 S. Ct. at 3049 (citing Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 714 (1962)).
The Court also considered Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), but concluded that Jackson did not mandate use of the "clear and convincing" standard for those found not guilty by reason of insanity. See 103 S. Ct. at 3049 n.12.
Jackson involved pretrial procedures, holding that an individual found incompetent to stand trial on criminal charges may not be confined indefinitely based
solely on that lack of capacity. Consequently, in Jackson no trial was held at
which affirmative proof of the defendant's criminal actions or dangerousness
could have been offered. See id. A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity,
on the other hand, does include affirmative proof of the defendant's criminal
acts.
56. Id. at 3049 (citing Lynch, 369 U.S. at 714).
57. Id. at 3049-50 & n.14.
58. See 369 U.S. at 714. For a discussion of Lynch, see supra notes 34-36
and accompanying text.
59. See 103 S. Ct. at 3050.
60. It is significant that additional evidence of Jones's mental state in support of commitment could have been easily obtained. The Supreme Court
notes from the record that a medical officer at St. Elizabeths Hospital, where
Jones was institutionalized, reported that Jones had a history of suicide attempts. See id. at 3050 n.14. The Court also noted that after a transfer to the
civil division of the hospital, Jones was returned to the forensic division due to
"disruptive" behavior. See id. In addition, following his unconditional release
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have been reinterpreting the Lynch "strong evidence" presumption as a "conclusive" presumption. If so, the Court
missed the opportunity to provide lower courts with an absolute, easy-to-apply rule by failing to make that reinterpretation
explicit. If the Court in fact intended to retain the "strong evidence" standard, its failure to be explicit may have the contrary result of providing lower courts a way to justify a
conclusive presumption. In any event, the Court's use of
Lynch increases confusion among lower courts in an already
confusing area.
In addition, although the Court claimed that the type of
crime committed is irrelevant and that commission of any
crime is sufficient indication of dangerousness, it offered no evidence to support this contention. 61 As Justice Brennan noted
in dissent, "[r]esearch is practically nonexistent on the relationship of non-violent criminal behavior, such as petitioner's
attempt to shoplift, to future dangerousness." 62 Although the
majority indicated that a "non-violent" crime such as theft may
actually precipitate violence as a result of the criminal's attempt to flee and police efforts to apprehend, 63 this does not
support use of the presumption in cases where the defendant
commits a nonviolent crime and does not flee or try to protect
the property but instead surrenders peacefully. If the criminal
act involved no dangerousness-only nonviolent antisocial behavior-use of the presumption of present dangerousness is
difficult to justify. Thus, even if the Court is revising the Lynch
standard to the effect that commission of a criminal act establishes a conclusive presumption of present mental illness and
dangerousness, the Court's apparent application of that standard to every case, supported only by conclusory statements
not always relevant, weakens the basis for the new standard
itself.
as a result of a lower court ruling in 1980, Jones was recommitted after two
weeks on an emergency civil basis for reasons unconnected with his original
commitment. Id.
61. See id. at 3050 & n.14.
62. Id. at 3057. The dissenters pointed out that researchers' and statisticians' attempts to identify dangerous individuals and predict future behavior
from a basic set of facts yield inaccurate results in approximately two-thirds of
the cases, with the errors almost always resulting in overprediction of future
dangerousness. Id. (citing, inter alia, Megargee, The Prediction of Dangerous
Behavior, 3 CRni. JusT. & BEHAv. 3, 11 (1976) ("Whatever the behavior sample
the clinician selects, it is no secret that the validity of our assessment techniques is less than perfect, and too often less than satisfactory."); see also
supra note 39.
63. See 103 S. Ct. at 3050 & n.14.
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As its second basis for upholding Jones's commitment, the
Court found that establishing mental illness and dangerousness by a "preponderance of the evidence" fulfilled due process
requirements in criminal commitment cases. 64 The Court reasoned that the concern expressed in Addington that an individual may be wrongfully committed on the basis of mere
idiosyncratic behavior65 is not present in the case of insanity
acquittees because a criminal act is, by definition, outside of
the acceptable course of human conduct. 6 6 In Addington, the
Court had also concluded that due process required use of the
"clear and convincing evidence" standard to place the risk of
erroneous commitment on the state because the state had
raised the insanity issue.6 7 In contrast, because Jones himself
raised and proved insanity as a defense, the Court determined
it was proper that he bear the risk of wrongful commitment
should he regain his sanity.68 Because the Addington risks
were not present in the case of insanity acquittees such as
Jones, the Court concluded that proof by a preponderance of
the evidence of present mental illness and dangerousness was
sufficient to meet due process requirements. 69
Although the Jones Court advanced valid considerations,
its analysis of the burden of proof issue is incomplete. The two
factors addressed in Addington are not the only considerations
relevant to the due process issue; the Jones Court failed to recognize both the state's strong interest in accurate, efficient
commitment decisions and the significant liberty interest retained by an individual who admits to having once been insane
but is being committed as presently mentally ill and danger64. See id. at 3051.
65. For a discussion of Addington, see supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
66. See 103 S. Ct. at 3051.
67. See 103 S. Ct. at 3051 (discussing Addington); supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
68. See 103 S. Ct. at 3051. Here, the Court asserted that the Addington concern, that an individual should not be forced "to share equally with society the
risk of error," id. (quotingAddington, 441 U.S. at 427), is not controlling in situations in which an individual has previously used the risk advantageously at a
criminal trial, see 103 S. Ct. at 3051. This analysis may indicate an underlying
punishment rationale for the Court's decision. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
In addition, in comparing the Jones situation to that in Addington, the dissenters note that the petitioner in Addington was committed on the basis of
previous disruptive behavior, including conduct that could have constituted
criminal assault. See 103 S. Ct. at 3055. The majority distinguished the two
cases, however, because the allegations against Jones were prosecuted and
proven. See id. at 3051.
69. Id. at 3051.
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ous. 7 0 In particular, the Court should have considered the intrusive nature of commitment following an insanity acquittal
and the procedural disparities between the treatment of individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity and candidates
for civil commitment.
The Jones majority failed to recognize that there is a significant state intrusion upon an individual following an insanity
acquittal. As Justice Brennan notes in his dissent, because of
its very nature, confinement in a hospital following a criminal
commitment may be more intrusive than imprisonment in a
corrective facility following a criminal conviction. 7 1 In addition,
the indeterminate nature of commitment following insanity acquittal makes the potential intrusion especially grave. Moreover, contrary to the majority's assumption, 72 the potential
state intrusion on one committed after an insanity acquittal is
at least as great as in civil commitment cases. An individual
who has admitted committing a criminal act because of mental
illness will likely find it more difficult to obtain release when
cured than would an individual committed civilly because of
unusual behavior. Commitment based on a past criminal act
may also influence the individual's treatment. Consequently,
although the risks mentioned in Addington arguably may not
be present, the potential intrusion is.
An individual raising the insanity defense is not admitting
70. Cf., e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (individual unnecessarily institutionalized for 15 years retained constitutionally guaranteed right
to liberty); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (due process clause entitles convicted prisoner to procedural safeguards before involuntary transfer to a
mental institution due to strong liberty interest involved).
71. 103 S. Ct. at 3060-61. Justice Brennan stated:
In many respects, confinement in a mental institution is even more
intrusive than incarceration in a prison. Inmates of mental institutions,
like prisoners, are deprived of unrestricted association with friends,
family, and community; they must contend with locks, guards, and detailed regulation of their daily activities. In addition, a person who has
been hospitalized involuntarily may to a significant extent lose the
right enjoyed by others to withhold consent to medical treatment. ...
The treatments to which he may be subjected include physical restraints such as straightjacketing, as well as electroshock therapy,
aversive conditioning, and even in some cases psychosurgery. Administration of psychotropic medication to control behavior is common ....
Although this Court has never approved the practice, it is
possible that an inmate will be given medication for reasons that have
more to do with the ndeds of the institution than with individualized
therapy.
Id. (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 3051 n.16 ("A criminal defendant who successfully raises the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and thus the
commitment causes little additional harm in this respect.").
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present insanity, as in a voluntary civil commitment, but only
claiming insanity at the time of the criminal act, which may
have been long before the trial.7 3 The Court cannot presume
that such individuals have no compelling interest in careful
commitment decisions.7 4 The insanity acquittee deserves the
same due process protections given others who face involuntary state intrusions, both procedural protections and the protection of not being committed unless proven presently
dangerous and mentally ill by clear and convincing evidence.
The Jones Court, however, ignored the procedural disparities in the treatment of insanity acquittees and civil commitment candidates by implicitly equating a criminal trial
resulting in an insanity acquittal with an initial civil commitment hearing. Although both a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity and a civil commitment involve findings of mental
illness and dangerousness are adversarial in nature7 5 and allow
for jury determination, 6 distinctions between the two procedures raise serious due process concerns. In the District of Columbia, insanity is an affirmative defense which the defendant
7 7 Civil commust show by a "preponderance of the evidence."
mitment, however, requires the state to make a showing of
present mental illness and dangerousness by "clear and convincing evidence."78 In effect, an insanity acquittee, by claiming the right to invoke the insanity defense at trial, waives the
right to the protection afforded by the "clear and convincing"
standard of proof for commitment.7 9 Another concern is the
73. Jones, for example, was not actually committed until six months after
his arrest. See id. at 3047. The court, however, did receive a hospital psychologist's report shortly before the commitment. Id.
74. See id. at 3061 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. The District of Columbia Code provides for counsel for "[t]he alleged
mentally ill person... in any proceeding before the Commission or the court,
and if he fails or refuses to obtain counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to
represent him." D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-543 (1981).
76. "An alleged mentally ill person with respect to whom the report is
made has the right to demand a jury trial, and the Commission, orally and in
writing, shall advise him of this right." D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-544 (1981).
77. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(j)(1981). The Code states that "[n]o person
accused of an offense shall be acquitted on the ground that he was insane at
the time of its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who raises the issue, is affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence." Id.
The Appellate Court for the District of Columbia upheld the constitutionality of the requirement of affirmatively establishing irisanity by a preponderance
of the evidence in Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1037 (1981).
78. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
79. The United States Supreme Court has previously expressed concern
that criminal defendants should not be forced to choose among constitutional
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District of Columbia Circuit's determination that insanity acquittees have no right to a jury trial at release hearings, a right
afforded civilly committed persons.8 0
In addition to these procedural disparities, the temporal focus of an insanity acquittal differs from that of a civil commitment hearing. Acquittal by reason of insanity indicates a
finding of diminished mental capacity at the time of an otherwise criminal act,8 1 while civil commitment is based on a deter82
mination of present mental illness and dangerousness.
Arguably, the present status of insanity acquittees is not sufficiently established prior to automatic commitment, especially
when the trial is held months or even years after the criminal
act.83 Furthermore, the tenuous nature of the presumption of
continuing insanity84 does not obviate the need for a complete
finding of present mental illness and dangerousness before depriving an individual of liberty.
These omissions in the Court's analysis convey the underlying message that error in a criminal commitment determination is less serious than a wrongful civil commitment. Implicit
in this message is an element of punishment-that wrongful
commitment of an insanity acquittee is acceptable because but
for the finding of diminished mental capacity the individual
would have been convicted and imprisoned.85 Although the
rights. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (testimony given
by a defendant to establish standing to oppose admission of illegally obtained
evidence cannot be used against the defendant at trial).
80. United States v. Henry, 600 F.2d 924, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("a
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
... he lacks substantial capacity"); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (determination of criminal responsibility is focused on past mental
condition).
82. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545(b) (1981) (governing civil commitment).
For a discussion of § 21-545(b), see supra note 9.
83. See generally Pasewark, Pantle & Steadman, Characteristicsand Disposition of Persons Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity in New York State,
1971-1976, 136 AM. J. PsYclnATRY 655 (1979). In this empirical study conducted
through the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, all but 14 of 225
persons acquitted by reason of insanity were committed to mental institutions.
The researchers noted: "It should be remembered that a substantial period of
time typically intervened between the patient's arrest and his or her enforced
hospitalization after acquittal. Hence it is quite probable that in some cases,
overt symptoms present at the time of the criminal act had abated." Id. at 658.
84. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
85. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 HAxv. L
Rlv. 605 (1981). The assumption underlying the lower standard of proof in
criminal commitment cases is that the individual is either responsible enough
to deserve punishment or insane enough to merit confinement in a mental institution. A related rationale is that potential erroneous criminal commitments
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Court denied any punitive motive in Jones, 86 the punishment
theory finds some support in previous Supreme Court rulings,
8
as well as in lower court holdings. 7
In upholding the District of Columbia's automatic commitment provision, for example, the Lynch Court acknowledged
that Congress may have intended the provision to discourage
false insanity pleas.8 8 Although this may be a legitimate goal,
the Court failed to consider that automatic commitment for an
indeterminate period may also penalize nonculpable individuals who are actually no longer mentally ill or dangerous by the
time of commitment. In addition, under Lynch, the District of
Columbia's automatic commitment provision does not apply to
those found guilty, sentenced, and later alleged to be insane,
but only to those claiming the insanity defense.8 9 Thus, it appears that an individual is being punished through diminished
due process rights not only for committing a criminal act, but
also for trying to "get off' by using the insanity defense. That
criminal defendants judged incompetent to stand trial must be
committed according to civil commitment standards further
supports this argument.9 0 Presumably, in those cases punishment is considered inappropriate; the individual judged incompetent to stand trial eventually may become competent and
have to face trial and imprisonment for the alleged criminal
are justified by their effect in "cleaning up" mistaken insanity determinations
made during the prior criminal trial.

86. See 103 S. Ct. at 3051. The Supreme Court quoted the court of appeals,
stating "Society may not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior because of
his insanity and at the same time punish him for invoking an insanity defense."

Id. at 3052 n.18 (quoting 432 A.2d 369).
87. See, e.g., Warren v. Harvey, 632 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1980). In Warren, the

court stated: "While the acquittee therefore may be deprived erroneously of
his liberty in the commitment process, the liberty he loses is likely to be liberty
which society mistakenly has permitted him to retain in the criminal process."
Id. at 931 (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606,

611 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Brown, the court asserted that "there is not only the
fact of harm already done, but the substantial prospect that the same error,
ascribing the quality of mental disease to a less extreme deviance, resulted in
legal exculpation where there should have been legal responsibility for the antisocial action." Id.
88. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 715 (1962).

89. See, e.g., id. at 714 (mandatory commitment under § 24-301 applies only
to insanity acquittees who invoked the defense); United States v. Wright, 511

F.2d 1311, 1314 (1975) (automatic commitment provision not applicable when
the trial court raises the insanity defense); Jones, 432 A.2d at 374 ("Automatic

§ 301(d) commitment does not follow an acquittal by reason of insanity when
the question of insanity is raised by the court or the prosecutor, rather than the
defendant.").
90. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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act.9 1
The Court's determination that individuals found not guilty
by reason of insanity are entitled to less due process protection
than are those who are civilly committed thus reveals an underlying punishment rationale. If the punishment element represents a new judicial attitude toward mentally ill offenders,
questions arise as to the continued validity of the insanity defense. Based on the idea that a culpable state of mind is a necessary element of criminal liability, the insanity defense is
available to criminal defendants who lack the requisite mens
rea and thus are not culpable.92 By tacitly approving less stringent commitment standards for insanity acquittees because of
past criminal activity, the Court intimates that such individuals
are in fact culpable and facilitates further erosion of the rights
of mentally ill offenders.
Perhaps partly motivated by the desire to deny any punishment element, the Jones Court concluded as its third basis for
upholding Jones's commitment that an insanity acquittee's hypothetical prison term is irrelevant to the length of commitment.9 3 The Court acknowledges that whereas penal
incarceration represents society's determination that an individual convicted of a criminal act should be confined for the
94
purposes of retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation, commitment to a mental institution is based on the need for treatment and protection. 95 Because an individual's mental
progress is difficult to predict, however, the Court concluded
that the necessary duration of such commitment must be left
undetermined.9 6 Moreover, because the purpose of commitment is to treat the individual, there is no reason whatsoever to
consider the individual's hypothetical prison sentence; the only
97
concern should be whether the individual has recovered.
The Court's analysis of this issue evidences the major
problem inherent in the Jones decision-inconsistency. The
91. Id. at 738.
92. Note, ConstitutionalLimitations on Allocating the Burden of Proof of
Insanity to the Defendant in Murder Cases, 56 B.U.L REV. 499 (1976).
93. See 103 S. Ct. at 3051. The Court stated that "[t]he committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous." Id. For this reason, "[tihere simply is no necessary correlation
between severity of the offense and length of time necessary for recovery," and
"[t]he length of the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his commitment." Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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Court's conclusion, that the time necessary for treatment and

protection is not determined by the length of an insanity acquittee's hypothetical prison term implies that the nature of
the otherwise criminal act should likewise not be determinative. Penal sentences are greatly influenced by the gravity or
dangerousness of the criminal act.98 If the length of a prison
sentence, "chosen to reflect society's view of the proper response to commission of a particular criminal offense," 99 is not
relevant to the duration of institutionalization, then by implication the quality of the act committed by an insanity acquittee
should have no bearing on the commitment process. Consequently, whether an individual indicated insanity by committing a criminal act, as opposed to a noncriminal act, should not
alter the procedural standards for commitment, and no distinctions should be made between civil and criminal commitment
candidates in making the determination of present mental illness and dangerousness. Earlier in the Jones opinion, however, the Court determined that insanity acquittees do not have
the same rights in commitment proceedings.oo Thus, the
Court's second and third contentions are contradictory and
either one or the other cannot be justified.
As noted above, the Court's second contention was apparently based on a punishment rationale. In reaching its third
contention, however, the Court claims that punishment is irrelevant to the treatment of those found not guilty by reason of
insanity. The Court's selective use of the punishment rationale
is improper and sends an ambiguous message regarding its
importance.
The Court's inconsistent reasoning and selective use of the
punishment rationale puts insanity acquittees in the worst position possible-they can be automatically committed for an indefinite period and are never provided a rehearing under the
"clear and convincing" standard. Instead, at all rehearings, the
committed individual, rather than the state, must shoulder the
98. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3006 (1983) ('"The final clause
[of the eighth amendment] prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also
sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed."); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) ("it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense"); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685
(1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 171-72 (1976).
99. 103 S. Ct. at 3052.
100. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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burden of establishing sanity.10 1 Considering the controversy
currently surrounding the insanity defense, this result may be
most in line with the thinking of the American public and may
evidence societal uncertainty with regard to the insanity defense. The Court's contradictory analysis of these issues reflects its unwillingness to contradict public sentiment in such a
controversial area.
Moreover, the Court's last basis for upholding Jones's commitment-deference to Congress-clearly supports this reading
of the Court's underlying rationale. Although the Court made
little express mention of this contention, it cited Marshall v.
United States1 0 2 for the proposition that courts should be cautious in construing legislation in areas marked by scientific and
medical uncertainty.103 This proposition, according to the
Court, carries particular force in the context of issues relating
to the insanity defense.10 4 The House report relied on by the
Court in Jones suggested that insanity acquittees, although theoretically not culpable, should not escape confinement because
of their diminished mental capacity,0os further evidencing the
punishment element in Jones which was explicitly rejected by
the Court.106
Justice Brennan adopts a better view in his dissent. He
urges that in this area of the law, where scientific facts are difficult to determine and public sentiment is strong, the peculiar
role of the Court as the protector of individual liberty interests
increases in importance. 0 7 Indeed, the basic requisites for
commitment-present mental illness and dangerousness-illustrate the balance that must be struck between the individual's
101. See supra note 5.
102. 414 U.S. 417 (1974).
103. Id. at 427.
104. 103 S. Ct. at 3053. The Court quoted from a House report to demonstrate the common fear that "'dangerous criminals, particularly psychopaths,
[may] win acquittals of serious criminal charges on grounds of insanity' and
yet 'escape hospital commitment."' 103 S. Ct. at 3049 (quoting ILR. REP. No.
907, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1970)).
105. See H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73-74 (1970).
106. See supra note 86.
107. See 103 S. Ct. at 3056-57. As Justice Brennan noted with respect to the
majority's explicit deference to Congress:
The question is not whether "government may not act in the face of
this uncertainty" . . . everyone would agree that it can. Rather, the
question is whether-in light of the uncertainty about the relationship
between petitioner's crime, his present dangerousness, and his present
mental condition-the Government can force him for the rest of his life
"to share equally with society the risk of error."
Id. at 3057 (citations omitted).
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rights and treatment requirements, and society's need for protection.108 Realistically, due process always requires balancing 0 9 and a "careful assessment of the likely impact of a
specific procedure on the competing interests to be affected
thereby."110 The Jones Court tipped the scales toward the interest of society"'l and, in so doing, gave too little weight to insanity acquittees' important liberty interests."12
Not only does this deference to congressional and public
sentiment call into question the effectiveness of the Court's
protective powers in the area of constitutionally-mandated liberties and due process rights of individuals, but it weakens the
Court's holding in Jones. When an opinion derives much of its
support from congressional declarations, it is vulnerable to potential shifts in public and, accordingly, legislative attitudes
that will strip the opinion of its foundation. Although such
change is not necessarily undesirable, whenever fundamental
liberty interests are involved such change is significant.
By sustaining Jones's commitment and upholding the District of Columbia's automatic commitment provision for persons found not guilty by reason of insanity,113 the Supreme
Court has confused lower courts as to the effect of a criminal
act on the presumption of present mental illness and dangerousness, and has failed to provide lower courts and state legislatures with a clear direction for distinguishing between
constitutional and unconstitutional commitment statutes. The
Court has retreated from its earlier position that civil and criminal commitment candidates, deserve the same protections
under the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.114 Implicit in the Court's reasoning that insanity acquittees differ from candidates for civil commitment in
108. To this balance, the dissent added the "difficulty of proving or disproving mental illness and dangerousness in court." Id. at 3056.
109. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
110. In re Nelson, 408 A.2d 1233, 1237 (D.C. 1979) (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
111. See supra notes 15 and 104.
112. The Court has often indicated the iinportance of these interests. See,
e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (due process clause protects liberty interests of institutionalized mentally retarded individual injured while
hospitalized); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (individual hospitalized unnecessarily for 15 years retained constitutional right to liberty); see also
supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 3 for the text of the District of Columbia's automatic

commitment provision.
114. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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such a way as to justify a lower standard of proof is the attitude
that such individuals are more dangerous 1 15 and less deserving
of procedural safeguards, regardless of the crime charged. Although the Court relied on these perceived distinctions between insanity acquittees and civil commitment candidates, it
gave no indication of how far commitment provisions for insanity acquittees can go within constitutional limits. Thus, the
Court may be faced in the future with statutes more onerous
than the District of Columbia's automatic commitment provision, such as one requiring a showing of mental illness by only
"some evidence."" 6 The extent to which the liberty interests of
7
insanity acquittees must be protected remains an open issue.n1
Moreover, the Court should have established clearer commitment standards for insanity acquittees inconsistencies in
the Court's analysis with respect to the criminal commitment
issue require further examination and resolution. According
insanity acquittees the same procedural safeguards as civil
commitment candidates is logically consistent with the premise
that an insanity acquittal means an individual is not culpable
and with the notion that commitment is based on the need to
protect, isolate, and treat individuals who are presently mentally ill and dangerous. 118 The Jones majority is correct in observing, however, that situational differences between insanity
acquittees and civil commitment candidates may justify different initial commitment procedures." 9 Although the majority
misread Lynch to stand for the proposition that prior commis115. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969) (a statutory presumption is unconstitutional "unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is
more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to
depend").
116. A recent survey indicated that most states allow insanity acquittees to
be committed under a lower standard of proof than candidates for civil commitment, while 19 states use the same standard for both types of commitment proceedings. See Note, supra note 85, at 605 n.3. Thus, such an onerous
commitment statute seems likely, especially in view of current controversy surrounding the insanity defense.
117. Jones probably will not have significant implications in other contexts,
but will be applied only in cases where the defendant raised insanity as a defense. Specifically, Jones apparently does not affect the status of individuals
transfered at the end of their prison terms. The Court explicitly distinguished
between prison transferees and insanity acquittees because the mental condition of prison transferees was not determined at trial, but at the time of transfer. Thus, it appears that prison transferees will continue to be afforded full
civil commitment procedures.
118. See 103 S. Ct. at 3051.
119. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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sion of a criminal act conclusively proves dangerousness,1 20 the
result-automatic commitment of insanity acquittees-is acceptable. Although the link between a past criminal act and
present dangerousness may be tenuous, especially in cases of
crimes involving no violence,121 an insanity acquittee's past antisocial behavior cannot be ignored. Society's desire to keep insanity acquittees off the streets is strong, and release of such
individuals after trial could severely undermine public respect
for the judicial system. The reduced risk of erroneous commitment in the case of insanity acquittees122 and such individuals'
past antisocial behavior, although not the only issues involved
in commitment, justify different procedural protections at the
individuals' initial commitments. The need to discourage false
insanity pleas123 and the desire to avoid the unnecessary time
and expense of de novo hearings immediately after criminal trials124 further support different initial commitment procedures
for insanity acquittees.
Despite these situational differences between insanity acquittees and individuals committed civilly, the reasons the
Court advanced for different treatment125 and the punishment
rationale apparently underlying the Court's decision1 26 are applicable only for the length of an insanity acquittee's hypothetical prison term. At some point, the insanity acquittee's liberty
interests must outweigh the state's concerns about protection
and treatment,12 7 and full civil commitment proceedings, including all of the procedural safeguards afforded to individuals
committed civilly, must be commenced. Although the expiration of an insanity acquittee's hypothetical prison term is an
admittedly arbitrary time to hold an additional hearing from
the standpoint of the purposes of commitment, 28 it is appropriate in view of the balance the Court has struck between the individual's rights and society's needs. At this point, society has
29
been protected from persons it perceives to be dangerous,1
3 0
false insanity pleas have been discouraged,
and unnecessary
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
(1976)).
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
See supra note 62.
See 103 S. Ct. at 3051.
See supra text accompanying note 88.
See 103 S. Ct. at 3050 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348
See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
See 103 S. Ct. at 3051.
See id.
See id.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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relitigation of the insanity issue has been avoided.131
Moreover, commencement of civil commitment proceedings
at the end of the insanity acquittee's hypothetical prison term
is in keeping with the outcome and rationale of the prison
transfer cases. 132 Like prison transferees, insanity acquittees
have never been proven mentally ill and dangerous under the
"clear and convincing evidence" standard. In both situations,
an individual's need for commitment has therefore not been
fully established by the state. Such protection is necessary, in
part, because of the difficulty an already-confined individual encounters in proving suitability for release. In addition, both
prison transferees and insanity acquittees have endured the
consequences of their past criminal acts and have regained the
status of private citizens. As such, both deserve due process
protections.
A recommitment hearing at the end of the hypothetical
prison term might make a difference in many cases. To obtain
release in the District of Columbia, an automatically committed
insanity acquittee must prove sanity by a preponderance of the
evidence at a release hearing. 133 Because of the difficulty of establishing relative sanity, whoever has the burden of proof has
the heavier burden.' 34 Furthermore, an institutionalized insanity acquittee, confined, surrounded by the mentally ill, and
with limited resources, will have a harder time establishing
sanity even by a preponderance of the evidence than would the
state of establishing insanity by a higher standard. Thus, a new
hearing at the end of the insanity acquittee's hypothetical
prison term would not be an idle exercise. More important, due
process rights are still involved and deserve protection, even in
cases in which the individual ultimately is indefinitely
recommitted.
The Court should thus instruct states to at least treat insanity acquittees and prison transferees similarly for commitment purposes. Although this analogy raises the inconsistency
of punishing individuals deemed nonculpable at trial, it is a socially acceptable, realistic way to deal with the issue of criminal
131. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 5.
134. The Supreme Court, rejecting the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in civil commitment cases, noted that "[t]he subtleties and nuances of
psychiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979). Thus, even under a less
stringent standard, proving relative sanity is difficult.
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commitment and also offers some protection to due process
rights. By providing a civil commitment hearing at which the
state carries the burden of proof at the expiration of an insanity acquittee's hypothetical prison term, both society's
needs and the individual's liberty interests are considered and
balanced. Although due process is a flexible concept,13 5 the significant liberty interests at stake in commitment require a
known, constitutionally adequate standard that states can follow in fashioning and evaluating their criminal commitment
provisions. Requiring a civil commitment hearing at the end of
an insanity acquittee's hypothetical prison term would provide
such a standard, the adoption of which would resolve the uncertainties created by the Jones decision.
Louise Dovre

135. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("due process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands").

